Short Message Service is usually used to transport unclassified information, but with the rise of mobile commerce it has become an integral tool for conducting business. However SMS does not guarantee confidentiality and integrity of the message content. This paper proposes a protocol called SMSSec that can be used to secure a SMS communication sent by Java's Wireless Messaging API. The physical limitations of the intended devices such as mobile phones, made it necessary to develop a protocol which would make minimal use of computing resources. SMSSec has a two-phase protocol with the first handshake using asymmetric cryptography which occurs only once, and a more efficient symmetric nth handshake which is used more dominantly. What distinguishes this work from conventional protocols is the ability to perform the secure transmission with limited size messages.
In this paper, a protocol called SMSSec is proposed that can be used to secure SMS communication between a WMA client and a server using end-to-end encryption. With endto-end encryption, the encryption process is carried out at the two end systems [25] . Similar work has been done by [4] where the authors make use of an approximated one-time pad scheme to encrypt SMS messages between two mobile phones. The limitation in this mechanism is that it does not ensure end-to-end encryption between the two mobile phones because there is a decryption occurring within the cellular network so that another one-time pad can be created for the receiving phone to decrypt the message. Because the message is required to be decrypted within the cellular network, there is a dependency on the network infrastructure.
Paper layout
This paper contains seven sections. Section 2 presents the security concerns of SMS messaging. Section 3 presents the proposed protocol in terms of the choices made on which cryptographic algorithms to use, design objectives and specification, fault tolerance and implementation considerations. Section 4 and 5 presents the security and efficiency analysis respectively. Section 6 mentions the future challenges facing SMSSec and section 7 concludes.
Security concerns
In this section an overview of the security issues within the GSM network infrastructure and the WMA package is presented. These security issues provide the pivotal motivation for this research. Section 2.1 discusses the security vulnerabilities when SMS messages are sent and section 2.3 gives a brief overview of the WMA package.
SMS message path between the mobile client and server
Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) is a capability built into the GSM standard for support of transmitting information over the signalling channels of the GSM network.
USSD provides a session-based communication that allows for a fast communication between the user and an application, for example mobile banking [10] . Some of the vulnerabilities within the GSM network infrastructure apply to USSD signals as well. In this paper, we are not going to focus on USSD but rather have a pure focus on SMS. An SMS packet contains a header and a payload (see Figure 1 ). The header contains information that enables the cellular network to route the SMS message to the correct recipient. The originating address (the mobile phone number of the sender) is also included in the header. The payload is the message content that is displayed on the mobile handset. The size of the payload is 140 bytes, consisting of 160 7-bit characters, or 140 8-bit characters, depending on the provider [4] . Those 140 / 160 characters can comprise of alphanumeric characters or binary bytes. The underlying carrier network illustrated in Figure 2 depicts the path of SMS messages being sent in a two-way direction between a mobile station 1 (MS) and the authentication source (AS) over a GSM network. The AS could be the backend server belonging to an issuing bank 1 The mobile handset is often referred to as the mobile station, where the MS consists of the terminal equipment (TE) and a mobile terminal (MT). The TE is the device that hosts the applications and user interaction, while the MT is the part that proves networking capability. For the rest of this paper, we refer to mobile handsets as mobile station, with the abbreviation MS.
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or a merchant where it verifies the authenticity of the person who is in possession of the MS.
The location of the AS is located in the internet. Assuming that a user wishes to transfer money to some other account, he/she would send a SMS that will initiate this process.
Therefore the SMS in this particular scenario would be sent from the MS first. The SMS message reaches the BSS via the air interface. The BSS composes of an base transceiver station (BTS) and a base station (BS) where a number of these base stations that form a coverage area can be connected to a base station controller (BSC). The BSS transfers the SMS message to the MSC over the A interface. The main purpose of the MSC is to control calls to and from other telephony networks. It plays a major role in subscriber roaming by providing all the necessary functionality involved in registering, authentication, location updating, SMS routing and call routing for a roaming subscriber. The MSC routes the SMS to the SMSC that the AS is connected to over the SS7 network. The connection between the AS and SMSC is facilitated by a GSM modem or a TCP/IP connection. It is possible to have more than one SMSC within the service provider to improve scalability. Once the AS has verified the MS, it will send an acknowledgement SMS message back to the MS. Once receiving the message at the SMSC, the contents of the incoming packets are examined and if necessary, converted into the SMS packet structure (see Figure 1 ). The SMSC queries a Home Location Register (HLR) to determine the location of the target MS. When the HLR locates the MS, it forwards the address of the MSC to the SMSC; otherwise the text is stored in the SMSC, until the target MS is located. The MSC then forwards the acknowledgement message to the BSS that serve the coverage area of the MS.
Network vulnerabilities identification and analysis
SMS messages are delivered in a best effort manner to other cellular telephone users asynchronously through the cellular network. These networks operate separately from the internet and are sometimes considered to be more secure, accessible and less open to misuse (such as spam). However the GSM network does not provide important security services such as mutual authentication, end-to-end security, non-repudiation or user anonymity [14] . In this section we present the vulnerabilities identified in [18] that occurs within a mobile payment environment.
Vulnerability at the MS
The main risk to a MS is theft or misplacement and as a result, the attacker could gain access to the data content stored on the MS. This threat applies to SMS messages. Even if the entire SMS communication path is encrypted, the decrypted SMS messages are stored within the SIM or persistent flash storage.
Loss of messages that do not reach their destination (SMS or USSD)
Because SMS messages are delivered in a best effort manner, there are no guarantees that a message will actually be delivered to its recipient. One can consider that there may be possibilities where messages routed between MS and AS could be lost. The impact of a message loss could result in the loss of privacy. However the feasibility of deliberate misrouting seems low, except if an attacker has access to any of the internal interfaces of the message handling system.
SMS Spoofing to the MS or AS
The possibility exists that an attacker manages to inject SMS messages into the messaging network with a 'spoofed' originator IDs. The attack can be applied in both ways by impersonating the AS for a legitimate MS or impersonating the MS for a legitimate AS. With the former case, the possibility of spoofing is very high as it is possible to send a SMS message from the internet with the correct headers, without the recipient being able to detect that it comes from the internet. Also the mobile service provider is able to change the originator ID. In the latter case, the possibility of spoofing is also high, however the attacker is required to know the authenticating information of the user.
Replay of messages
The possibility exists that an attacker arranges for authentication request and/or authentication response messages to be replayed. An attack on the reply of an authentication request message does not seem obvious, however replaying an authentication response could be a more serious vulnerability. If such a replay is possible, it can be used to impersonate a legitimate user and hence authenticate a false transaction. Note however that this attack will not work if there exists an authentication request number (anti-replay mechanisms) that must be included in the response.
Capturing and Modifying of data during OTA transmission
SMS messages are sent across the air interface between the MS and BSS (indicated by A in Figure 2 ). In most GSM networks all traffic (digitised voice and data) and signalling data sent across this air interface is encrypted. However, the choice of whether or not to encrypt the data is network specific (it is under the control of the BSS) -in a number of countries, encryption is not permitted. Moreover the choice of encryption algorithm is also network specific, although it must be one of two GSM-specific algorithms known as A5/1 or A5/2. 
Vulnerabilities of the BSS
GSM authentication is a one-way process i.e. the MS is authenticated to the BSS but not vice versa. As a result it is possible for the operator of a 'false' BSS equipment to 'capture' the MS. Of course, this false BSS will typically not possess the keys necessary to set up encrypted communications to the MS, but given that encryption is under BSS control, the false BSS can choose to simply disable encryption. BSS equipment is (apparently) not difficult to obtain and is not expensive, however in order for this attack to be successful, the MS should be within the area of the false BSS. If the transaction is of a type where the legitimate user is likely to be in a particular location, then routine 'capture' of the user's MS using a false BSS is simple to arrange.
Lack of protection for message passing through SS7
The security of the SMS/USSD messages sent across the SS7 networks depends on the levels of physical security provided for these networks and also on the nature of the cryptographic security, if any, provided for these networks. The security provision of the SS7 network is operator dependent. The realization of this vulnerability is a loss of privacy, extraction of sensitive information and DoS. The SS7 network is physically protected but not under the control of a single entity. The protection of the SS7 network against the injection of messages is thus only as effective as the weakest protection offered by any of the operators since messages can be injected into the weakest point of access. As mentioned earlier, GSM MAP is an unencrypted protocol allowing employees within the cellular provider's network that has access to a SS7 network to eveasdrop or modify SMS messages. Also, the SS7 network is not a Federal Information Processing Standard approved for carrying sensitive information [19] .
However, given these circumstances, the difficulty the attacker will experience is finding within the high volume of traffic, a particular message that contains sensitive data.
Vulnerabilities of the SMSC and USSDC
If the SMSC/USSDC is accessible in some way to an attacker, then it may be possible to read/manipulate the messages in transit. As with the SS7 networks, the degree to which the SMSC (or USSDC) systems are protected is not known (and probably difficult to find out).
The protection almost varies between countries and between operators.
Lack of protection of the interface between SMSC or USSDC and AS
If the interface to the SMSC (or USSDC) is accessible in some way to an attacker, then it may be possible to read/manipulate SMS (respectively USSD) messages in transit. In such a case, several threats could arise such as possible extraction of sensitive information within the message. As mentioned earlier, a typical connection between the AS and SMSC is facilitated by a GSM modem or a TCP/IP connection. Because the traffic is outside of the mobile operator, it is not the responsibility of the operator to ensure its protection. The connections between the internet and cellular network introduce open functionality that detrimentally affects the fidelity of a cellular provider's service [8] . To top it all, according to [19] the link between the SMSC and AS is unecrypted.
WMA package
As mentioned in Section 1, WMA is an optional package for J2ME that enables an application developer to develop an application that sends and receives an SMS. Figure 3 , illustrates the components within the WMA package. None of these components includes any encryption mechanism to protect the confidentiality content of a SMS message during transit. Also, the WMA 1.1 specification [27] stipulates that for security purposes, an application must be granted permission to send and receive messages. Unfortunately, granting permissions for these operations does not ensure confidentiality. Therefore, developers must supply their own security information and accompanying mechanism if they wish to secure the content.
To handle SMS on server computers, one can develop a J2SE/J2EE WMA implementation that interacts with the SMSC via a GSM modem or TCP/IP connection [37] . In fact, the "Generic Connection Framework Optional Package for J2SE" (JSR 197) [26] provides a generic connection framework implementation for J2SE and hence allows the WMA to be ported to Java platforms beyond J2ME. Unfortunately, such an enterprise server-compatible WMA implementation is not available at the time of this writing.
SMSSec: the proposed protocol
In this section, various aspects concerning the design of the protocol are discussed. These aspects include the choice of cryptographic algorithms, fault tolerance and implementation.
Design Requirements
There are two main challenges that were encountered during the design of SMSSec. The first is the limited CPU strength and physical memory size on the MS. To ensure confidentiality and integrity of SMS messages, cryptographic algorithms are required. Cryptography can be computationally expensive to perform especially when public key cryptographic functions are used. We do not prefer to sacrifice security over efficiency so careful judgment needs to be made on the choice and utilization of cryptographic algorithms on a MS. The choice in cryptographic algorithms for SMSSec will be discussed in the next section. The second challenge is the SMS message structure and its length. In order to be compliant with all types of SMS's, the encryption algorithm should possess three attributes, namely [4]:
1. The encrypted message should be in the form of ciphertext in order to meet the SMS message body standards.
2. The encryption algorithm cannot alter the size of the message, since that would cause initially large messages to exceed the maximum allowed size after encryption (no padding).
3. The encryption algorithm should be simple and computationally inexpensive.
Based on the security threats defined in section 2 and the limitations mentioned in the above two paragraphs, a security protocol of this nature should satisfy the following requirements outlined in [16] :
− secure, − easy to implement, − low computation needs, − no storage of secret cryptographic keys, − achieve entity authentication (integrity), − achieve key exchange (confidentiality).
In addition to these requirements, we further set objectives to ensure that there is: − no transporting of secret keys and user's personal identification number (PIN) on any computing environment or intermediate station in GSM network, − sufficient speed in encryption and decryption, − use of existing commercially available crypto algorithms, − availability of end-to-end encryption, − reliability, − no additional security protocol (for example Kerberos) or network related hardware infrastructure required for implementation.
The result of applying SMSSec is illustrated in Figure 4 , where the SMS message is protected for the entire duration of its transit through the network. 
Cryptographic algorithm choices
According to the objectives laid out in the previous section, it is evident that all cryptographic systems such as symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems and message authentication code (MAC) are going to be used. The algorithms within the systems chosen should enhance the system's security and efficiency, with security being given at a higher priority than efficiency.
It is no good to develop a security protocol and blame the insecurity on the poor choice of the crypto algorithm. In Table 1 , the cryptographic algorithms required in SMSSec are listed. For symmetric cipher, the choice is obviously to go for AES for its speed, efficiency and standardization [5, 24] . The counter (CTR) mode is easy to implement and does not introduce padding and collisions (provided that the counter is unique for each key) [9] . In this way, both these combinations are recommended for securing SMS applications with a small payload size. For a true 128-bit system, a 256 key is recommended due to the birthday paradox [9] . Another reason for supporting a 256-bit key is that due to the cryptic nature of SMS messages, it facilitates easier cryptanalytic attempts based on word frequencies. Therefore by using a 256-bit key, it basically thwarts any cryptanalytic attempts.
Algorithm

Key size Description
For asymmetric cipher the choice is to use the RSAES-OAEP scheme [23] . The RSA cipher has been trusted for many years and is still the most currently used cipher for securing ecommerce applications. The Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) encoding function is included to destroy any mathematical structure within small messages that might be used in mobile applications [21] . As technology advances in factoring the RSA primes [22] , the safest key size for the next 20 years is 2048-bit [9] . The reader might wonder why not choosing Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as the core benefit of ECC compared to RSA is that it appears to offer equal security for a far smaller key size, thereby reducing processing overhead [33] . The reason for not choosing ECC is because various aspects of ECC have been patented by a variety of people and companies around the world. Notably, the Canadian company, Certicom Inc. holds over 130 patents related to elliptic curves and public key cryptography in general [19] .
HMAC with an underlying hash function called SHA256 (HMAC_SHA256) is chosen due to the recent attacks on collisions on SHA1 [35] and on recommendation by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology that SHA1 is to be phased out by the year 2010.
Therefore by proactively choosing a hash function that will last beyond the year 2010 is essential. HMAC is required to protect the digest against partial collision and length extension attacks [9] .
Design specification
SMSSec is a protocol that uses asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography and two-factor authentication strategy. There are three criteria that authenticate a user namely: something the user knows (such as a password), something the user has (such as a credit card) and something the user is (such as is embodied in a fingerprint). Two-factor authentication is any authentication protocol that requires any two of these forms of authentication to access a system.
The following denotations are used for the explanation of the protocol design and they will be At this point, the reader might question on the use of RSA cipher since one block of the encrypted RSA output exceeds 140 bytes when 2048-bits key is used, which means more than one SMS message are needed if the message content is going to be encrypted using a 2048-bit RSA key. In order to ensure a more efficient protocol, SMSSec is divided into two separate handshakes namely the First and the nth handshakes so that asymmetric and symmetric encryption techniques can be effectively utilized. These two handshakes are illustrated in 
First handshake
The first handshake is defined as follows: possibly the number of rounds (r) used to stretch the PIN [9] . The password stretching technique mentioned in [9] is more efficient than [22] as it contains less computations and it works as follows: Let p be the PIN and s be the salt. Using any cryptographically strong hash function h, C can compute the SK as:
The parameter r is the number of iterations in the computation, and should be as large as practical. It goes without saying that X i and SK should be 256-bits long; therefore the recommended hash function is SHA256. The size of r is chosen such that computing SK takes 200-1000 milliseconds on a user's equipment [9] and is therefore never a fixed value. This concept applies to the MS as computing speed of the MS will increase in the future; therefore by not having a fixed r value, r can increase accordingly to the computation speed. There are other cryptographic libraries that have key generators [2, 17] , which might require different 2 For security purposes, the PIN is usually a hashed value of the actual numbers and it is stored at the S so that those actual numbers are not shown. The reader can reuse HMAC_SHA256 to compute a hash value for the PIN for the protocol. 3 The salt is a random value of 256-bits generated by a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator.
input to generating a symmetric key, therefore the value D will be dependent on those input requirements, for example, an inclusion of a counter or an initialization vector.
It is important for the reader to note that both the C and S are able to regenerate M2: Once C is authenticated, S will generate a new private port number P j which C should use for further communication after M2. The reader should note that P j is generated uniquely per user; therefore the protocol should manage which ports are used and not used at S. This is to ensure more privacy and scalability is given to each connection. SQ will start at 1 5 signalling that this is the first message sent using symmetric key encryption. S will encrypt M2 by generating SK in the same way C did in M1 using D. By using symmetric key cryptography, the size of the message can be sent within one SMS message and requires less computation compared to asymmetric key cryptography. Once C receives M2 it decrypts the message and verifies R c . S is authentic to C, if C can decrypt and verify R c , because only the legitimate S can generate the SK. Otherwise if C cannot verify R c it discards M2 and the protocol terminates. After C verifies M2 the handshake completes.
M3 and Mn: M3
and Mn are the subsequent SMS messages sent between the C and S. The S will still send SMS messages to the port P z on C, but the C will send messages to the new port number P j 6 . The entire duration of the communication is encrypted using SK. Both C and S must ensure the SQ in the current message is incremented since the previous message. This is to ensure that no replay attacks have occurred during the entire communication using the shared SK between C and S. If SQ is out of sequence in either C or S, the protocol should terminate with an appropriate timeout error message. The C does not need to send a terminate message to the S to close any communication. If there are no more SMS messages sent from C, a timeout would occur at S. Once the timeout occurs, the P j assigned to that particular C would be freed.
nth handshake
The nth handshake is defined as follows: It is not efficient for SMSSec to always use the RSA cryptosystem to engage in the handshake because it will cost two SMS messages for M1. Therefore, to save computation, time and monetary cost on the number of SMS messages send during the handshake, the nth handshake is used. The nth handshake denotes the subsequent new handshakes conducted when the user wish to establish a new connection with S. The first handshake will never be used again, except for fault tolerance (see section 3.4).
M1:
The formation of M1 is similar to the M1 in the first handshake, except using symmetric encryption. In order for the S to distinguish which user the M1 is sent from, the C appends HU in front of M1. The C regenerates the HU by reusing the salt value it retrieves from the record store. The D n and Q n are the newly generated D and Q values for the current handshake. Q n is the result of incrementing Q by 1. The entire M1 is encrypted using the SK established during the previous handshake. Before M1 is sent, C replaces the D and Q with D n and Q n . Once S receives the M1 via port P z , it should determine that the message is smaller than 256 bytes; therefore HU is split from M1 and is used by S to look up within the secure database, the HU established from a previous session. If the matching HU is not found the protocol will terminate, otherwise D is retrieved to regenerate SK in order to decrypt M1.
Once M1 is decrypted, the values H and Q are evaluated in the same way as it is described in the first handshake, with an extra requirement for Q to be a higher value than what S has. C is authenticated to S because it encrypted M1 using the same SK that S knew from a previous handshake after verifying Q and H. Before S sends M1, the values of D, Q and HU are replaced with D n , Q n and HU n , so that these values will be reused again until the next protocol establishment.
M2:
Once C is authenticated, S will encrypt the same message content as it is described in the first handshake, with the exception that the entire M2 is encrypted using SK_n that is generated in the same way as it is described in the first handshake by using the new D n . Once C receives M2, it uses its own generated SK_n to decrypt M2. The S is authentic to C, if C can decrypt and verify R c , because only the legitimate S can generate the SK_n. Otherwise if C cannot verify R c it will discard M2 and the protocol terminates. After C verifies the M2 the handshake completes.
M3 and Mn:
Subsequent messages are commuicated in the same way as it is described in the first handshake, with the exception that these messages are encrypted using SK_n.
Security of persistent storage
An important security consideration is ensuring the values D and Q are stored securely on MS. The record store system for MIDP ensures that the record generated by a Java application is only accessible by itself [6, 15] . This means that no other Java applications on the MS may write or delete a record store.
Securing the database at the S is just as important. There are two customary types of database security mechanisms that are used to prevent unauthorized access to databases namely discretionary and mandatory [7] . It is not the focus of this paper to provide specific instructions on securing databases, however it is important for the reader to note that SMSSec requires security mechanisms in place for the databases it accesses.
Fault tolerance
Fault tolerance means a system can still provide a service even in the presence of errors [31] .
Here are some possible scenarios that one can encounter errors on a MS during SMS messaging: − Crash failure: Before or after the messages are sent, the MS suddenly crashes. The cause for this crash could be memory fault, persistent storage space is full, or worse a software bug within the implementation of the operating system, and so on. − Omission failure: The MS itself fails in receiving or sending messages as a result of a crash or loss of message within the communication path. The server might have a receive omission failure due to battery failure on the MS after an SMS message was sent. − Timing failure: The MS can experience timing failures when the server times out due to an error in transmission. Sometimes timeouts can be caused by incorrect delivery of message sequences. For example in the case of M1 in the first handshake, the entire message is 256 bytes therefore the message will be split into two 140-byte messages and if the messages are not reassembled in the correct sequence, the server will not be able to decrypt it.
SMSSec should have a mechanism to recover from these errors because during the protocol run, elements such as D, Q, HU are saved and these values might be inconsistent if either the C or S experiences a failure.
If a failure occurs, the most feasible and efficient solution is to have a forward recovery by asking the user to engage in the first handshake again. The developer can create an option within the application menu to force the protocol to engage in the first handshake in case of an error within the communication. By using the first handshake, C recreates D and Q and sends them to S in M1 exactly as it is described in section 3.3.1. Once S receives the message it verifies H and Q and determines Q is a higher value than a 0. Therefore S can safely replace the old D and Q with the current value and the protocol continues. A question that might arise is what happens if a failure occurs during the correcting of the error in first handshake? As long as the Q generated by the C is a higher value than the Q stored in S, it doesn't matter. For example, during a second attempt at error recovery, C might have a Q value of 23 and the server 21, but because 23 is greater than 21, the S will accept the values as long as H is verified. A more difficult question is what happens if the Q in C is lower than the Q in S.
There is a possibility this might happen because Q might not be written onto the flash storage within the MS. Therefore a situation occurs where the Q on both the C and S might equal or that the Q on C might be less than the Q on S. Generally speaking, the difference between the Q values on C and S is 1 within an error free communication and should hardly go beyond 10; otherwise there is something wrong with the hardware of the MS, network or the actual server and SMSSec should not be deployed. Therefore during fault handling, the Q generated by C should be incremented by 10 from the previous Q in order to be safe from all these problems.
The last problem is what happens when Q reaches 2 31 -1 7 at the C? The possiblity of this happening for SMS messaging is slim because it is quite impossible for the C to establish so many SMSSec connections. For example, assuming a user wishes to establish on average 10000 connections a day (an impossible target anyway), then this user would take ≈ 588 years for Q to reach 2 31 -1!
Implementation considerations
A suggested architecture placement of the SMSSec protocol within the system is illustrated in Figure 6 . By referring to the protocol design in Figure 5 and the package dependency structure in Figure 6 , SMSSec is easy to implement with no additional protocol or hardware infrastructure required for implementation.
Security analysis
In this section, a more detailed security analysis of SMSSec is presented.
Application of public key cryptography
The two main concerns of asymmetric key cryptography are the authenticity of the public key and private key management. Anyone can generate and forge a public key and falsely claim who they are. In order to prevent this, the public key is digitally signed by a certificate authority (CA). All Java applications are deployed on mobile phones in the form of a compressed Java Archive (.jar) file. Ideally this jar file must be cryptographically signed by the developer of the software and downloaded securely onto the mobile phone via HTTPS or Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS). It is recommend to follow this practice in order to support SMSSec since the public key will be protected within the jar file along with the other class files. This prevents tampering of the authentic public key by an attacker. The public and private key pair is generated at the server and the private key is kept securely in a secure key storage mechanism. A further security enhancement provided by MIDP 2.0 8 enabled phones is the verifying of the cryptographically signed jar file on the MS, which gives users some security about executing downloaded code [13] . In this way, the certificate encapsulated within the jar file is also verified so that man-in-the-middle attacks can be prevented.
If the server is compromised and the private key is retrieved by an attacker, the whole protocol will fail because the attacker can act as the legitimate party. Therefore an effective key management on S is crucial.
Authentication between two entities
One of the objectives of SMSSec is to ensure authentication between two parties (C and S).
By ensuring SMSSec is analysed according to the three rules that Tanenbaum [30] mentions for an authentication protocol:
1. Have the initiator prove who he/she is before the responder has to.
2. Have the initiator and responder use different keys for proof.
3. Have the initiator and responder draw their challenges from different sets.
In point 1, S does not have to respond to C if it fails to verify the H and Q. Verification of H would fail if C provides the wrong PIN and Q provided by C is smaller than the Q stored on S as the MAC result would not be the same. Before C will respond any further after M2, the SK generated by S should be the same as the SK generated by C and further verification should be done on the R c to prove to C that S sent the message for the current protocol run using the session key SK. In point 2, the C uses the public key of S in M1 and in M2, S responds by proving it can generates the SK. In point 3, the Q both is higher for C and lower for S. Once the handshake establishment completes, the SQ keeps an odd and even challenge value between the C and S for further communication.
Validating the protocol
As already mentioned in section 2, not all vulnerabilities share the same feasibility for an attack. This section presents attacks to SMSSec by assuming all of the vulnerabilities are feasible and it is just as easy to launch attacks as it would be on a public network. In order to attack the SMSSec, an assumed role is made so that either C or S could be the attacker. For the first attack, S is the attacker and C is legitimate. S captures M1 but cannot decrypt it because it does not have the private key. What S can do is that it can try to fool C by sending a previously captured M2. When C receives this M2, it will discard it because the SK used is different to the previous handshake and the protocol terminates.
For the second attack, assume C is the attacker and further assume C has the U. C can generate M1 and send it to S. However the problem is that C does not know the PIN, therefore it cannot generate the correct H. Even if the U is known, it is difficult to compute HU because of the 256-bit secret value used for the HMAC. The only way to send a legitimate M1 is by guessing the correct PIN and computing the correct HU, which is quite impossible to do if the PIN is stretched with a 256-bit salt.
We further analysed SMSSec using the AVISPA tool [32, 34] , which is a state-of-the-art push-button tool that analyzes for any possible attacks in an internet security protocol. The first handshake was modelled using the HLPSL (High-Level Protocol Specification Language), which is the input for the AVISPA tool. The techniques used to find security weakness are the On-the-fly Model Checker (OFMC) and Constraint-Logic-based Attack 
Security advantages
There are four main security advantages SMSSec provides. The first advantage is that the PIN and the SK are not included in M1 because key exchange through network transactions degrades the reliability of a security system [12] . The main idea is to get both C and S to generate SK by using the PIN they share between them. An attack on the encrypted M1 would not be fruitful if the opponent does not know the PIN. However this might lead to dictionary or brute-force attacks on the PIN. But as already mentioned earlier, a brute-force attack on the PIN is fruitless. Due to the fact that SK is always generated when used, it is not stored on the MS and in this way SK is not compromised if the MS is stolen. The second advantage is achieving mutual authentication (section 4.2). The third advantage is using strong cryptography. Lastly, end-to-end encryption is achieved which ensures the messages sent 9 The analysis was done on typed-message model between the MS and AS is protected against attacks mentioned in section 2 namely:
eavesdropping, message tampering and message replay.
Efficiency analysis
Although SMSSec uses strong cryptography, it is still efficient to use on a MS. In this section, an efficiency analysis on the number of SMS messages sent and handshake duration are presented. For nth handshake, the size of the M1 is the same as the first handshake but with an extra 32 bytes for the HU to be appended in front. The size of D would be limited to 22 bytes for sending M1 within one SMS message. In general the nth handshake is far more efficient than the first and if there are no communication errors, the entire handshake could be done using two SMS messages instead of three.
Number of SMS messages sent
Communication after both handshakes could be done using one SMS message, depending on the size of M. However, by appending SQ the size if M is reduced to 136 bytes. After successful first handshake establishment and with the continuation of using the nth handshake, SMSSec complies with the three requirements mentioned in the second paragraph of section 3.1.
Handshake duration
In this section, the handshake duration is measured according to the time taken (in milliseconds) for the both the first and nth handshakes to complete on the C and S.
Due to the unavailability of a WMA implementation for a desktop server, the S will be another MS. The specifications of the C and S are summarised in Table 2 . The goal behind this performance analysis is to give the reader an approximation on the duration of the handshakes especially experienced at the C. The duration for M1 and M2 denotes the time taken for the devices to compute M1 and M2 according to what is described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The time taken for the entire protocol to complete successfully is registered at the C and not at the S because C receives the last handshake message. The network used to conduct this experiment is a GSM type network.
Attributes
The actual SMSSec protocol is implemented using the Linca API [17] and Tables 3 and 4 present the first and nth handshake durations respectively. As expected, the performance for the nth handshake is much quicker. The experiment was conducted in two tries for each handshake, with each try taken at a random time during the day. What is interesting to note is the time taken for the SMS messages to be send across the network takes longer than computing M1 and M2 because the delays observed for the time taken for the entire handshake to complete includes the durations of M1 and M2 for both the C and S. The time for S can be faster if an actual server is used instead of another smart phone.
Future challenges
The current work shows the feasibility of executing the protocol between two mobile phone peers. Future work is to implement SMSSec on a WMA enabled J2SE/J2EE server and doing further research into the scalability of the protocol. Concurrently, work is underway to determine the feasibility of implementing SMSSec for other mobile device operating systems such as Symbian OS, Pocket PC, Windows Mobile (.NET Compact Framework 2), Qtopia and Palm OS. When implementing on these operating systems, security analysis on accessing the persistent storage will be conducted.
Due to the flexibility of SMSSec, a study will be conducted to determine the applicability of implications of GPRS and 3G [11] apply to MMS messaging as well; therefore it is worthwhile to look into the possibility securing MMS messages.
Currently, MIDP 1.0 phones are still dominating the market [28] , but with MIDP 2.0 being released on newer phones, there will still be a mixture of the two MIDP versions in the market for a few years. Although HTTPS is implemented for MIDP 2.0 phones, [6] found that the Reference Implementation of SSL for MIDP 2.0 uses only the system time (System.currentTimeMillis()) for its seed update. Hence in order to obtain the random values generated by the client, all what the attacker has to do is to guess the precise system time (in milliseconds) at the moment of the random value computation. Based on this weakness, it would seem ideal to improve HTTPS in MIDP 2.0 using SMSSec where it could be applied on top of HTTPS within the application; however further research is required to determine whether the two protocols can function together, without changing SMSSec if needed.
Conclusion
SMS communication is not totally secure and therefore it should not always be trusted. To place trust on SMS messaging especially if it is used in an enterprise environment, a protocol should be in place to ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication between the two communicating parties. Due to the lack of security in WMA and SMS messaging in general, a protocol called SMSSec is presented to ensure an end-to-end secure SMS communication.
Throughout this paper, SMSSec is found to be secure, reliable and efficient. Further work is required to apply SMSSec on other mobile operating systems and services.
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